

TOP SECRET

25 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: COP

SUBJECT: Outline of Operational Plan for EGFIED

1. Reference is made to my memorandum of 7 November 1949 suggesting that this Branch be authorized to proceed with new operational planning for EGFIED, which was approved by you, and to your memorandum of 17 November 1949 to ADPC concerning the objectives of EGFIED. In meetings and discussions with [] and [], we have considered steps necessary to implement recommendations g and g of your reference memorandum.

2. There is attached an outline of an operational plan for EGFIED which embodies our joint and agreed views with respect to your recommendations. Although this plan envisages certain departures from some of our previous concepts, we consider that, in view of the security restrictions under which we must operate, the attached represents the only feasible technique for the present.

[]

Copy #1 to Addressee

#2 to CFP

#3 to NSO

#4 to DGO

#5 to PB-I

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

COP/JCM/C/Lrb

Copy 5 of 5 copies

DOWN GRADE PER
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION
NOV 20 1990

35415

TOP SECRET

25 November 1949

OUTLINE OF OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR HOFFEND

1. There should be established in the immediate future in the U.S. Zone of Germany a holding area for Albanians to include facilities for a maximum of approximately 500 persons. These should include IRO Albanian refugees from Italy and non-IRO Albanian refugees from Italy, Greece, Turkey, Syria and Egypt. There should be no activities of a training, subversive or clandestine nature at this camp. It should be established more or less overtly as the result of a request from the Committee for Free Albania to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany for facilities for welfare activities by that Committee in view of the impending shut-down of IRO and as an interim measure until the Committee is able to make more permanent arrangements for Albanian refugees (OPC would, of course, have pre-arranged this matter with the High Commissioner). This camp would be administered by the Albanians themselves, although we would have in the administration of the camp one of our own Albanian speaking officers under the guise of an employee of the Committee. It would be his function to assess the personnel in the camp as to suitability for future operations, liaison with OPC personnel and to make such arrangements as might be necessary for removal of certain of the Albanians as might be necessary from time to time.

2. [] should be approached to participate in HOFFEND, their immediate contribution in clandestine operations being a completely isolated training area in French North Africa to which recruits from the holding area in Germany would be brought. OPC would bear the cost of the establishment and maintenance of this training area, which would require one OPC officer whose function would be principally liaison and control. Training should include physical hardening, weapons training, W/T, map reading, organizational training, political indoctrination, and operational briefing.

3. After gaining [] acceptance to the foregoing [] and [] should be approached simultaneously to participate in HOFFEND, their contribution being the infiltration of the agents trained at the French North African base. We should subsidize their operations to this end. In this connection, [] would be required to infiltrate overland and [] by sea. OPC and the British would

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

retain direct control of infiltration by air, using Greek and/or Italian bases. OPC and British representatives should also maintain control over communications throughout all phases of the operation.

4. The principal function of OPC personnel throughout the foregoing proposal would be direction, control and liaison, and their direct operational activities would be cut to a minimum. Control would be exercised principally through placement of U.S.-British personnel in key positions of responsibility, as well as through subsidies. This method would be more in keeping with our personnel resources and security limitations than is the effort to conduct this operation ourselves without the participation of the authorities controlling the essential areas near the target. It should also be pointed out, of course, that the Greeks are in any event using American cover for their present operations into Albania.

5. Under this suggested technique such matters as travel of Albanian personnel, communications, transportation and supply become enormously simplified. With respect to security considerations the activity by foreign services directed at penetrating our Albanian operation will be eliminated in the case of [] and [] which should have a decidedly salutary effect on the amount of information available to Soviet controlled agents, since [] will then devote their efforts to protecting our interests rather than exposing them. There is the additional advantageous factor of the effect on Soviet calculations with regard to continued support of Albania if they find themselves confronted by what is in effect an Allied operation rather than a joint U.S.-British operation.

TOP SECRET